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5 
THE JUDICIAL LEGACY OF LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE 
NATURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Famous as a lawyer, political activist, democratic theorist, ad-
visor to presidents, and Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis is unquestionably a major figure in Ameri-
can history.1  The greatest part of his fame, of course, arises from his 
service on the Supreme Court and the reputation that he earned there 
as one of the Court’s truly great Justices.2  Even his severest critics—
and he has a number of them—concede to that greatness.3  One gauge 
 
 Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School.  The author wishes to 
thank Jethro K. Lieberman and colleagues at the New York Law School faculty colloquium 
for their helpful comments, and New York Law School students Dana Cimera and Jordan 
Moss for their assistance in preparing this essay. 
1 For a sampling of the many books on Brandeis that are not otherwise cited below, see 
generally GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF REGULATED COMPETITION, 
1900-1932 (2009); ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED 
LAND (1988); SUZANNE FREEDMAN, LOUIS BRANDEIS: THE PEOPLE’S JUSTICE (1996); ALLON 
GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); DAVID C. GROSS, A JUSTICE FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS (1987); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE (1946). 
2 Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 986, 987 (1967) (“[B]y common consent Brandeis is among the greatest of 
Supreme Court judges.”); Clyde Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel 
and the Book of Brandeis, 79 J. AM. HIST. 125, 125 (1992) (“No one holds a more secure 
place in this judicial pantheon than Louis D. Brandeis.”).  Brandeis has commonly been 
ranked as a great justice. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influ-
ence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 403, 445-49 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Su-
preme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 93, 122-26 (1995). 
3 E.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 135 (1984) (criticizing Brandeis’ flawed 
contributions to regulatory theory and practice but conceding his greatness as a judge).  For a 
qualification of McCraw’s critique, see Nelson L. Dawson, Brandeis and the New Deal, in 
BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 38, 38-64 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989).  For criticisms of Brandeis 
as a lawyer, see, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as Peo-
ple’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996), and as a judge, see, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
1
Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
6 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
of his high standing is the fact that judicial opinions have continued 
long after his death to invoke his name, a kind of recognition that he 
shares with only a handful of the Court’s hundred-plus Justices who 
have passed from the scene.4  Perhaps even more impressive, is the 
fact that it is his individual opinions—concurrences and dissents, not 
majority opinions—that judges and scholars most commonly cite.5  
Brandeis’ “judicial mind,” Alexander Bickel concluded, was “one, 
surely, of the half-dozen most influential ones in our history . . .”6  In 
this symposium, however, I attempt neither an evaluation of Brande-
is’ achievements nor an assessment of his continuing influence.7  In-
 
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 126, 143, 145, 
146, 150 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION]. 
4 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (citing Brandeis’ concur-
rence in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)); Hodgson v. Minneso-
ta, 497 U.S. 417, 446 (1990) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 
335-36 (1920)); Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 
(1986) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 
U.S. 38, 84 (1936)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (citing Brandeis’ dis-
sent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander, 
297 U.S. at 345-48); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966) (citing Brandeis’ dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)); New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76).  
Individual Justices also frequently cite Brandeis by name in their separate opinions, see, e.g., 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brande-
is’ dissent in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477-79, 483-85); W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 
186, 216 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co., 
285 U.S. at 311); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 418 (1922)); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1000-01 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 247 (1926)); United 
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 709-10 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brandeis’ 
dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) and Brandeis’ concurrence in St. Jo-
seph Stock Yards Co., 298 U.S. at 77); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Brandeis’ dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas 
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)). 
5 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S 
HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 187 (2015).  “Brandeis’s dissents 
would lay the foundation for the future and are the great examples of how one can engage in 
and affect not just the constitutional dialogue but the larger question of what rights we value 
as a free society.”  Id. at 151. 
6 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, Preface to THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, at vi (1957). 
7 For an insightful consideration of Brandeis’ continuing relevance, see Jeffrey Rosen, 
Why Brandeis Matters, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 29, 2010), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/75902/why-brandeis-matters.  For an earlier assessment by 
Brandeis’ successor on the Court, see Hon. William O. Douglas, The Lasting Influence of 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, 19 TEM. L.Q. 361 (1945). 
2
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stead, more broadly, I want to consider what his career on the 
Court—his judicial legacy—can teach us about the nature of Ameri-
can constitutionalism. 
II. BRANDEIS’S JUDICIAL LEGACY 
Quite strikingly, Brandeis’ judicial legacy began even before 
he went on the high bench in 1916.  His famous article on privacy, 
published in 1890, resonated with later generations and became a 
source repeatedly invoked on the long path that led to the establish-
ment of a constitutional right to privacy.8  Equally well known, his 
brief in Muller v. Oregon9 in 1908, the famous “Brandeis brief,” 
helped reorient constitutional argumentation by highlighting the im-
portance of the factual context in which rules of law are applied.10  
Once on the bench, he pressed both of those ideas, insisting that pri-
vacy was a fundamental right11 and that a detailed understanding of 
the relevant facts was a prerequisite for wise judging.12  The “logic of 
words,” he famously declared, “should yield to the logic of reali-
 
8 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing 
to Warren & Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 192 (1890)).  Douglas, in turn, 
wrote for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, expanding the right of privacy to include 
fundamental rights involving privacy and the use of contraceptives. 381 U.S. 479, 480-86 
(1961).  In Griswold, Douglas did not cite Brandeis, but Justice Arthur Goldberg, joined by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan, concurred and cited Brandeis’ dis-
senting opinion in Olmstead, which maintained that privacy rights are fundamental. Id. at 
494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 
5, at 204 (“[T]he Court and the country have accepted Brandeis’s notion that the Constitution 
embodies a right to be let alone.”).  It should be noted, however, that Brandeis’ idea of a 
right to privacy stemmed from far different concerns and values than did the constitutional 
right to privacy that subsequently developed. See, e.g., Richard Chused, Appropriate(d) 
Moments, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 109-27 (2015). 
9 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
10 On the Brandeis Brief, see PHILLIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE 
PEOPLE 114-31 (1984) [hereinafter STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE]; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 213-27 (2009).  For an argument minimizing the importance of 
the Brandeis brief, see David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 9 
(2011). 
11 E.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney, 
274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
12 Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 120, 
122 (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989) (“The most important contribution of Brandeis to consti-
tutional interpretation and to keeping the Constitution a living one was his emphasis on 
facts.”); UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 130 (“One thread that runs through 
all his endeavors is the need to know the facts.”).  For Brandeis’ judicial use of facts, see, 
e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-616 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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ties.”13 
Brandeis’s judicial legacy, of course, boasts a great many oth-
er contributions as well.  He had a significant impact on a wide range 
of doctrinal areas from antitrust and commercial law to administra-
tive law and utilities regulation,14 and he sometimes exerted an 
unacknowledged influence over the Court’s decisions when his inter-
nal advocacy among the Justices led them to alter their final opinions 
and judgments.15  He was a leader in establishing legislative history 
as an important source of judicial reasoning,16 and he was the first 
Justice to cite law review articles in his opinions, a practice that ini-
tially drew objection but subsequently became widely accepted.17  
His famous metaphor of the states as laboratories18—a novel and 
classic product of his early twentieth-century Progressivism—created 
an enduring image of the federal system, an image that his successors 
have repeatedly deployed and that has become widely accepted as a 
fundamental principle of federalism.19 
 
13 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).  “Unless we 
know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we cannot properly decide whether 
they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Jay Burns 
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
14 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 610. 
15 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 67-68, 74, 96-99, 101, 202, 212; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE 
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 369-70.  As one student of the Court concluded from studying sev-
eral pairs of Justices, “the more influential and effective justice was the one more willing to 
moderate the application of his principles in the name of the broader good of the Court and 
the country.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES 
THAT DEFINED AMERICA 21 (2006). 
16 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 59 (“Brandeis’ method of ascertaining legislative purpose, for 
which he gained no acceptance in [a particular] case, has made much headway.  It is as nor-
mal today as it was unusual then for the Court to look to legislative materials for indications 
of basic purpose and then to apply broadly or poorly worded statutes in conformity with that 
purpose.”).  For a discussion of the uses of legislative history, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 365, 366 n.5 (1990) (suggesting that 
Brandeis also had doubts about legislative history); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Ver-
sus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1653 (2010) (examining use and significance of legislative history on Court from 1953 
to 2006). 
17 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 82, 474. 
18 E.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
19 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their 
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is 
far from clear.”).  Brandeis developed the “states as laboratories” idea long before he went 
on the Court. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 165-69 (2007) [hereinafter PURCELL, 
4
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Above all, it was in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
where Brandeis had his greatest impact.20  His opinions, addressing 
such issues as the nature of executive power, the scope of the Com-
merce Clause, the contours of preemption, and the reach of the police 
power helped shape contemporary constitutional law.  To cite one 
important if relatively technical example, he was a major force in 
transforming the Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence under both the 
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.21 
Perhaps most centrally, Brandeis authored enduring opinions 
that have shaped our understanding of the nature, role, and limits of 
federal judicial power.  In one direction, he was a paramount force in 
developing ideas of judicial restraint and in forging a variety of doc-
trines to support the broad principle that federal courts are rigorously 
limited in their powers.22  He urged the federal courts to exercise their 
authority sparingly, defer in most instances to the actions of the other 
levels and branches of government, and invoke the Constitution only 
when absolutely necessary.23  In a series of opinions he spelled out 
the reasons for giving legislatures broad discretion in enacting regula-
tory measures,24 allowing ample leeway for administrative agencies 
 
ORIGINALISM].  Reformers “ought to get the full benefit of experiments in individual states” 
before proposing federal actions, he argued in 1912.  “There is great advantage in the oppor-
tunity we have of working out our social problems in the detached laboratories of the differ-
ent states.”  2 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 640 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy 
eds., 1972). 
20 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 640 (“[N]o justice of the twentieth cen-
tury had a greater impact on American constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
21 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA, 182-85 (2000); Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domi-
cile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
1240, 1302-19 (2015). 
22 E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553, 605-23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing, 254 U.S. 443, 479-88 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
23 See EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA: HOW THE AGELESS WISDOM OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS WAS INVENTED 68 (2011) (explaining Brandeis was “the first Supreme 
Court Justice to expound fully” on what later became known as “the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty,” the idea that judicial review conflicted with democratic government and should 
therefore be exercised only as a last resort). 
24 STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF 
LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 307 (1994) (“The particularities of a case were always of great 
importance to Brandeis, but as we have seen this rarely prevented him from seeking the wid-
est possible powers of discretion for state legislatures.”). 
5
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to use their expertise,25 and adhering strictly to the jurisdictional lim-
its that confined the reach of the federal courts.26  “[T]he most im-
portant thing we do,” he famously told Felix Frankfurter, “is not do-
ing.”27 
Brandeis not only urged that both policy and discretion fre-
quently counseled restraint, but he also stressed that Article III man-
dated constitutional limits as well.28  The Court had long held that ju-
dicial relief was not available to a claimant who had not suffered an 
injury, but since John Marshall’s day it had considered that require-
ment rooted in the common law principle that judicial relief was 
available only when a party had suffered injury from the invasion of a 
legal right.29  In an opinion in 1922, however, Brandeis transformed 
that injury requirement into an explicitly constitutional limitation on 
the federal judicial power.30  “Plaintiff’s alleged interest in the ques-
tion,” he declared in Fairchild v. Hughes,31 was only a generalized 
public concern and not a claim of specific injury particular to the 
plaintiff himself.32  Thus, it did not present “a case within the mean-
 
25 E.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (rebutting 
the presumption of facts sufficient to support exercise of police power same for administra-
tive agencies as for legislatures); Great N. Ry. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 
(1922) (identifying the basis of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies in the ability 
of “a body of experts” to effectively resolve complex fact issues); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429-42 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v Solum, 247 
U.S. 477, 484 (1918) (expanding the doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agen-
cies).  The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton 
Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907); see also UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 5, at 189-91; Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1042 
(1964); G. Edward White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of 
Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L.J. 195, 207-08 (1974). 
26 PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 120-24; 
Paul A. Freund, Introduction to BICKEL, supra note 6, at ch. 1; Preface to BICKEL, supra note 
6, at xv-xxi. 
27 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 
313 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 
28 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922). 
29 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion.”).  As late as 1938, for example, Justice George Sutherland continued to assume that 
standing was a requirement based not on Article III but on the common law. LEE, supra note 
23, at 77. 
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ing of [S]ection 2 of [A]rticle [III] of the Constitution.”33  As Evan 
Tsen Lee noted in his study of the standing doctrine, “[n]o previous 
decision had attributed a plaintiff’s ineligibility to go forward to Arti-
cle III.”34  Subsequently the idea took hold, and the Court has come to 
hold consistently that injury is a core constitutional component of the 
standing required to bring an action in the federal courts.35 
Brandeis advanced his ideas of judicial restraint in many 
opinions36 and ultimately enshrined them most famously in his con-
currence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.37  There, he 
pulled together a wide range of disparate cases to advance the sweep-
ing proposition that, as a matter of both principle and practice, the 
“[t]he Court . . . has avoided passing upon a large part of all the con-
stitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.”38  In doing so, he 
framed seven avoidance rules that would bar the federal judiciary 
from reaching many constitutional issues in cases.39  Subsequently, 
his ideas of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance became 
common currency,40 and Justices have repeatedly cited his Ashwan-




34 LEE, supra note 23, at 40.  Earlier decisions had referred to the Article III case or con-
troversy limits on the federal judicial power, but they had focused on elements other than 
injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (explain-
ing the term case in Article III “implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties, 
whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication"); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. 
Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 46-48 
(1851) (noting federal judicial power does not extend to claims subject to final review by 
executive official). 
35 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984). 
36 See, e.g., King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 565 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 72, 74-75 (1922) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
37 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-49, 351, 354-55 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring); Jaffe, supra note 2, at 988 (“[T]he Ashwander case is a locus classicus of ju-
dicial abstention.”). 
38 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
40 For invocations of his avoidance principles, see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
122-24 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (urging the importance of constitutional avoidance); 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318-20 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  For a 
formal avoidance doctrine inspired by Brandeis’ views, see R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).  For an analysis of the avoidance doctrines, see generally Li-
sa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994). 
41 Due to divisions on the merits, Justices often cite Brandeis’ Ashwander concurrence 
while disagreeing on the applicability of its avoidance doctrines. E.g., United States v. 
7
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While Brandeis advocated numerous doctrines of judicial re-
straint, he also pressed the Court in another and quite opposite direc-
tion, one that ultimately helped establish a far different and more as-
sertive judicial power.  World War I and the issue of free speech 
proved the catalysts.42  Although Brandeis joined a unanimous bench 
in upholding government prosecutions under the Sedition and Espio-
nage Acts in early 1919,43 he quickly began to rethink his position 
and by the end of the year broke sharply from the majority.44  First, 
he joined Holmes’s ringing dissent in Abrams v. United States45 that 
attempted to transform the Court’s recently announced, but flaccidly 
applied, “clear and imminent danger” test into a significant limitation 
on governmental power.46  Then, the very next year he struck out on 
his own, writing three bold dissents that rejected repressive govern-
ment actions, two by the federal government under the Espionage Act 
and one under a state statute that prohibited interference with military 
 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697-99 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majori-
ty’s refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 
2020, 2044 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s refusal of avoid-
ance and urging the use of the doctrine); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 
14-18 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (urging the use of the avoidance doctrine and insist-
ing that the majority reaching the constitutional decision was unnecessary); Webster v. Re-
prod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532-33, 535-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion and reasoning on avoidance while urging the Court 
to reach the issue presented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973)); Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 158-59, 163-67 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagree-
ing with majority’s refusal of avoidance and urging the use of the doctrine); Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (urging a constitutional decision on the 
merits). 
42 Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 659, 660 (2007) (suggesting that Brandeis’ commitment to free speech grew in part out 
of his early reform experiences where open debates on controversial issues proved “crucial 
to his success”). 
43 See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 
204 (1919); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
44 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919)  (Holmes, J., dissenting, noting 
Brandeis’ concurrence with the dissent). 
45 250 U.S. 616. 
46 Id. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  In a unanimous opinion written by Holmes, the 
Court articulated its “clear and present danger” test in the first of its World War I First 
Amendment cases. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.  For a discussion of the role Holmes and Brande-
is played in developing doctrines that gave greater protection to speech, see generally DAVID 
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 342-80 (1997).  For the ways in which 
Brandeis moved beyond Holmes and toward a broader theory of First Amendment protec-
tions, see generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s 
“First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557 (1999); Pnina Lahav, Holmes 
and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J. L. & POL. 451 
(1988). 
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recruiting.47  In each he sought to strengthen the “clear and present 
danger” test as a limit on governmental power and insisted on the 
paramount social and political importance of free speech.48  That 
right was invaluable, he maintained in Gilbert v. Minnesota,49 sound-
ing his most fundamental Progressive values, because it protected 
freedom of thought, “the privacy and freedom of the home,” and the 
“right of free men” to employ reason and public discussion “to strive 
for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions.”50  
Of even greater long-range importance, his dissent suggested that at 
least some parts of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the 
concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause and thereby made bind-
ing on the states.51  He urged that proposition more forcefully as the 
years went by,52 and decades later that proposition became a funda-
 
47 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-84 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce 
v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270-73 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 
334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 
323-24 (explaining that in the early 1920s Brandeis confided to Frankfurter that he had 
“never been quite happy” about agreeing with the Court’s first free speech decisions, when 
he had “thought at the subject, not through it.  Not until [he] came to write the Pierce [&] 
Schaefer cases did [he] understand it.”). 
48 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce, 252 U.S. at 270-73 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
50 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 335 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM 124 (1993) (“The Gilbert 
dissent nonetheless laid the foundation for a major alteration of American law and for a reas-
sessment of political values.”); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra 
note 5, at 177-78.  Recognizing the extent to which he was breaking new ground, Brandeis 
wrote Frankfurter asking that he and Zechariah Chafee, another Harvard Law Professor, re-
view his Gilbert dissent to see if there was “any flaw in the reasoning in the dissent.” Letter 
from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 16, 1920), in “HALF BROTHER, HALF 
SON”: THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 53 (Melvin I. Urofsky & 
David W. Levy, eds., 1991) [hereinafter HALF BROTHER].  Earlier in the year, Chafee had 
published a book entitled Freedom of Speech that was highly critical of the government’s 
suppression of speech during the war. Lynne Wilson, Book Review: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
Defender of Liberty and Law by Donald L. Smith, 11 U. OF PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 
(1988). 
51 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Brandeis seemed to pull back from 
this contention when he wrote later in his Gilbert dissent that his views were based on the 
idea of the privileges and immunities of citizens. Id. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
The case presented “no occasion to consider whether [the Minnesota statute] violates also 
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  He nonetheless seemed to 
make it clear that, if the issue were presented, he would hold that the statute also violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
52 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[A]ll fun-
damental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution 
from invasion by the states.”). 
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mental constitutional principle that would underlie sweeping changes, 
transform the law of civil liberties, and substantially broaden the con-
stitutional rights of all Americans.53 
By the early 1920s Brandeis began to suggest more pointedly 
that the protections of due process should extend beyond property 
rights to include all “things that are fundamental.”54  In 1923, break-
ing with Holmes and many Progressives, he joined the Court’s opin-
ion in Meyer v. Nebraska55 and accepted the proposition that due pro-
cess included a substantive component that protected family 
autonomy rights.56  Two years later, this time with Holmes coming 
along, he joined the Court in reaffirming Meyer and holding that 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty  included the rights of parents and 
guardians “to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control.”57  The same year he joined Holmes dissent in Gitlow v. 
New York58 and declared that “the general principle of free speech” 
was “included in the Fourteenth Amendment.”59  Six years later, after 
repeatedly urging greater protections for free press,60 he joined Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion for a bare five-Justice majori-
ty in Near v. Minnesota61 and held that freedom of the press was also 
 
53 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, The Brandeis Agenda, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA, supra note 12, 
at 135 (“For it was Brandeis who pointed the way in the most important jurisprudential de-
velopment of this century, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states by incorporating 
its provisions through the Fourteenth Amendment.”); accord UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, supra note 5, at 179. 
54 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 320; see also Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 
373 (“Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the 
[F]ederal Constitution from invasion by the States.  The right of free speech, the right to 
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.”). 
55 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923). 
56 The Court voided a state law that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in pri-
mary schools by stretching the liberty that due process protected to include educational and 
parental rights that were “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id. at 
399.  For the opposition of Progressives, including Frankfurter, to Meyer, see GERALD 
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 377-78 (1994). 
57 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a de facto anti-
Catholic state statute). 
58 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brandeis, J.). 
59 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
60 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482, 494-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United 
States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
61 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.62  Three years after that he 
joined Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo’s concurrence in Hamilton v. 
Regents of the University of California63 assuming that First Amend-
ment “religious liberty” was also protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a proposition that a unanimous Court accepted only six 
years later.64 
As Brandeis expanded his idea of incorporating fundamental 
rights, he also moved to develop a more rigorously protective stand-
ard for determining the scope of First Amendment speech rights, an 
evolution that culminated in 1927 with his powerful concurrence in 
Whitney v. California.65  There, he reiterated many of the First 
Amendment themes he had developed since 1920 and issued perhaps 
the most compelling defense of free speech in the Court’s history.66  
First, he based his defense of free speech on a sweeping principle.67  
The “rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental,” and “all 
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by 
the [F]ederal Constitution.”68  Second, he rooted that constitutional 
principle in the values of free and open democratic government.69 
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in 
the power of free and fearless reasoning applied 
through the processes of popular government, no dan-
ger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and pre-
sent, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so 
 
62 Id, at 722-23.  In 1936, Brandeis joined the Court in affirming the right of freedom of 
the press under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-
44 (1936); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-370 (1931) (affirming the 
right of free speech against the strictures of a state criminal syndicalism statute). 
63 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
64 Id. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring, joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  Brandeis had left the Court the year before Cantwell 
was decided. 
65 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  The case involved a conviction under the 
California Criminal Syndicalism Act statute, which made it a crime to help organize or join 
any group that taught or advocated the use of “unlawful acts of force and violence” as a 
means of promoting “political change.” Id. at 359-60.  Brandeis concurred in the judgment 
affirming the conviction on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
Id. at 380; see PHILIPPA STRUM, SPEAKING FREELY: WHITNEY V. CALIFORNIA AND AMERICAN 
FREE SPEECH 113-14 (2015). 
66 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The 
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 681 (1988). 
67 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity 
for full discussion.70 
Third, he advocated an extremely demanding version of the “clear 
and present danger” test.71  “The fact that speech is likely to result in 
some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its 
suppression,” he declared.72  “There must be the probability of seri-
ous injury to the State.”73  In testament to his teaching, the Court in 
1969 adopted a similarly stringent test protecting free speech and ex-
plicitly overruled the majority opinion in Whitney that Brandeis had 
so forcefully challenged.74 
On a parallel course, he also inspired an expansion of Fourth 
Amendment protections.75  As he had reacted against governmental 
repression of free speech and political dissent during and after World 
War I, so he grew increasingly disturbed during the 1920s by gov-
 
70 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  He continued: 
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, 
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied 
is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify re-
pression.  Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with 
freedom. 
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
71 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374. 
72 Id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
73 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Brandeis continued: 
Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are al-
leged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to pre-
sent the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger, 
whether the danger, if any, was imminent, and whether the evil appre-
hended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction inter-
posed by the Legislature. The legislative declaration, like the fact that 
the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court of the 
State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions have 
been satisfied. 
Id. at 378-379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  He rephrased the standard at several points, each 
stressing the narrow and demanding conditions that must be met before the government 
could restrict First Amendment rights. Id. at 373-74, 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
74 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).  Brandeis’ “lasting contribution to 
democracy itself is the towering opinion he wrote in Whitney” which has “informed all dis-
cussions of free speech since.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 641.  See, 
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (quoting Brandeis’ Whitney concur-
rence in arguing for the central importance of free speech to democratic government); see 
Blasi, supra note 66, at 682-84. 
75 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 618.  Had Brandeis written nothing but 
Olmstead and Whitney, “his impact on American constitutional law would still have been 
great.” Id. 
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ernment abuses in enforcing Prohibition.76  Although he supported 
vigorous police efforts that he recognized as reasonable and neces-
sary,77 as the decade lengthened he became ever more determined to 
stop what he regarded as enforcement excesses.  He sought to have 
the Attorney General curb the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s of-
fensive and sometimes unlawful tactics78 and protested the govern-
ment’s use of undercover spies.79  Privately deploring “the horrors of 
official inquisitorial methods,”80 he believed that the nation’s police 
and prosecutorial practices “carry us back to the age of torture.”81  
Dissenting from the bench, he criticized government officers for en-
trapping defendants and chastised judges for showing an excessive 
“zeal to punish.”82  Sometimes, too, his views prevailed.  In 1924, he 
wrote for a unanimous Court holding that brutal and protracted inter-
rogation methods rendered a confession inadmissible,83 and three 
 
76 E.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924); see also Letter from 
Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 
231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF 
BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 
23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 242-43; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Fe-
lix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 272; Letter from Louis D. 
Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 350; 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627. 
77 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administra-
tive States: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) [herein-
after Post, Federalism].  Brandeis joined the Court in several decisions strengthening law-
enforcement efforts. E.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (holding that state 
and federal governments were separate sovereignties, and hence that Double Jeopardy 
Clause did not bar separate and subsequent prosecution); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925) (holding that automobile search did not require a warrant if officers met a rela-
tively undemanding probable cause standard). 
78 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 627. 
79 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 4, 1927), in HALF BROTHER, 
supra note 50, at 272 (calling for “the needed investigation of the government prostitutes—
sometimes called spies, and euphemistically known as detectives, inspectors, special agents 
& intelligence officers”).  See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 15, 
1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 231-32; Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix 
Frankfurter (Feb. 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 232-33; Letter from Louis 
D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 23, 1926), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 242-
43. 
80 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 28, 1927), in HALF BROTHER, 
supra note 50, at 308-09; see LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE 
OF AMERICA’S TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 309-10 (1983). 
81 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 4, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, 
supra note 50, at 350-51. 
82 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
83 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1924). 
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years later in Gambino v. United States84 he wrote for the Court in 
broadening the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.85 
Most famously, in 1928 Brandeis issued his ringing dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States,86 denouncing the federal government’s 
use of wire-tapping as a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments.87  In conducting their investigation, federal officers had vio-
lated a state’s anti-wiretapping law, and their crime became the gov-
ernment’s crime when the United States Department of Justice 
“sought . . . to avail itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accom-
plish its own ends.”88  In that case the government “assumed moral 
responsibility for the officers’ crimes” and itself became “a law-
breaker.”89  Could the Court, Brandeis asked, “sanction such conduct 
on the part of the executive?”90  He flatly rejected the possibility.  
“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen.”91  Here, too, Brandeis’ separate opinion had a 
far-reaching impact, as the Court soon began moving toward his posi-
tion and eventually limited and then effectively overruled the majori-
ty’s opinion in Olmstead.92 
Finally, Brandeis pointed the way toward what initially be-
came the idea of “preferred freedoms” and then the more enduring 
idea that the judiciary had a special duty to protect both fundamental 
rights and “discrete and insular minorities.”93  In the spring of 1936 
 
84 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). 
85 Id. at 312, 314, 317. 
86 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
87 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
91 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Privately, Brandeis saw Olmstead 
as another example of the Court’s social biases. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix 
Frankfurter (June 15, 1928), in HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 333 (“I suppose some re-
viewer of the wire-tapping decision will discern that in favor of property the Constitution is 
liberally construed—in favor of liberty, strictly.”). 
92 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (interpreting federal statute broadly 
to hold evidence resulting from illegal wiretaps inadmissible in federal prosecutions); Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (concurring on the ground that the majority opinion 
overrules Olmstead sub silentio); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explain-
ing that the Olmstead trespass analysis is no longer controlling). 
93 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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he concurred alone in St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States94 
and proclaimed the existence of a pivotal distinction.  The Constitu-
tion not only protected all fundamental liberty rights, he declared, but 
it also afforded some of those individual liberty rights greater protec-
tion than it accorded others.95  The Court, he declared boldly, “has 
weighed the relative values of constitutional rights” and placed some 
of them—including First Amendment rights—above the rights of 
property.96  Two years later he joined Justice Harlan F. Stone’s fa-
mous opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.97 and creat-
ed another bare majority for the far-reaching proposition that Brande-
is had suggested as early as 1920, that issues impinging on free 
speech, fundamental rights, and the proper functioning of democratic 
processes should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.98 
Were I attempting to evaluate Brandeis’s judicial legacy, I 
would of course have to consider what his many critics have identi-
fied as the flaws and failures in his jurisprudence.  Brandeis has been 
charged with holding deeply misguided economic ideas, for example, 
and he has been repeatedly attacked as being too political, too activ-
ist, and too result-oriented.99  Indeed, what some people regard as his 
 
94 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring). 
95 Id. at 77-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
96 Id. at 73, 77, 81 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Two years earlier Brandeis had joined Rob-
erts’s dissent, with Sutherland and Butler, in a 5-4 decision in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 123 (1934), arguing that due process included the right of a criminal defendant to be 
present at all phases of a trial, including a view. Id. at 127-29.  There, Roberts distinguished 
between due process protection of property, which covered only “actual injury,” and of fair 
“procedure in the courts,” which guaranteed not merely “a just result” but also “that the re-
sult, whatever, it be, shall be reached in a fair way.” Id. at 137 ((Roberts, J., dissenting). 
97 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
98 Id. at 152 n.4.  Stone cited Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney in support of the proposi-
tion that free speech was critical to the democratic political process. Id.  For Brandeis’ early 
opinions suggesting such heightened scrutiny, see Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253, 
273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334, 337-38 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  For the short-lived “preferred” freedom idea, see, e.g., 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (proclaiming the “preferred place” of First 
Amendment rights and citing Carolene Products Co. in support). 
99 E.g., WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, at 145-46 “When the 
insights generated by an inquiry into facts harmonized with his own predilections, conclu-
sions became irresistible.  Once he had drawn conclusions, he was not particularly tolerant of 
opposing views, nor terribly anxious, as a judge, to allow them much weight.” WHITE, THE 
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 3, 171.  “Brandeis was the crusader.  No less 
than McReynolds, on the far side of the fence, did Brandeis seek to write his own economic 
ideas into law.” FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955 227 (1955).  See PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE 
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“most famous opinion,”100 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,101 has been 
subject to extensive and severe criticism, some of it surely warrant-
ed.102  One prominent scholar has even argued that Erie was not 
merely “wrong” but “pernicious” and that it stands out in the Court’s 
long history as “the Worst Decision of all Time.”103  This is perhaps 
hyperbole. 
In any event my purpose is neither to evaluate Brandeis’ judi-
cial legacy nor to assess the arguments of his critics and defenders.  It 
is, rather, to consider what his career teaches about the nature of 
American constitutionalism.  With that in mind, I turn not to what his 
critics have said but to the other side of his legacy coin, to the issues 
and areas where Brandeis’ ideas have been ignored, discarded, or 
flatly rejected—in other words to the cast-offs from his judicial lega-
cy.104 
III. BRANDEIS’S JUDICIAL LEGACY: THE CAST-OFFS 
Most arresting is Brandeis’ private belief in the early 1920s 
that the Fourteenth Amendment should be repealed.105  Today, of 
course, that amendment stands unchallenged as a central pillar of 
modern American constitutional law.  While his belief was under-
standable in the context of his time and his political views, this par-
ticular Brandeisian idea now seems wholly wrong-headed, potentially 
catastrophic, and surely dead and buried. 
Equally dead and buried are the assumptions that supported 
 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 124-32. 
100 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 65 (1990). 
101 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
102 The decision was “terribly misguided.” Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal 
Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 833 (2013).  For criticisms, see, e.g., 
MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE DOWN CONSTITUTION ch. 10 (2012); PURCELL, 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 155-64. 
103 Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All 
Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011). 
104 All the great figures in American constitutional history have suffered their cast-offs.  
Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued that Congress could make federal questions exclu-
sive to the federal courts, a rule that holds today, but he also maintained that the federal 
courts could review state court decisions, a position that was quickly rejected.  Similarly, 
Chief Justice John Marshall held in Marbury that Congress cannot increase the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, which remains good law, but his contention in the same opinion 
that Congress could not alter the Court’s original jurisdiction has been rejected in favor of 
allowing Congress to shift cases within that jurisdiction to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
5 U.S. at 138, 174.  On various issues, all the great Justices have suffered similar fates. 
105 Urofsky, Brandeis-Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 325. 
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Brandeis’ faith in Prohibition.106  His commitment to that disastrous 
“social experiment”  was intense on both the personal107 and the judi-
cial108 level.  Today, such assumptions and such a commitment seem 
naive in the extreme and wholly out of accord with contemporary 
views and values. 
Other typically Brandeisian ideas seem largely passé.109  
Brandeis’ faith in science, expert administration, and government 
regulation seems, at a minimum, excessively optimistic.  The fre-
quency of agency capture, the “revolving door” between regulators 
and regulated, and much disappointing practical experience have 
combined to chasten hopes and expectations.  Contemporary com-
mentators, even if still hopeful, are commonly more skeptical, while 
many have become deeply hostile to administrative agencies.110 
Along similar lines, Brandeis’ determined opposition to “big-
ness” in all its forms, a repeated theme in his writings,111 appears tan-
gential if not irrelevant to the pervasively centralized structural con-
ditions of modern life.  So, too, his deep hostility to corporations,  
another major element in his thinking.112  Although resentments 
 
106 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 626. 
107 Although Brandeis “liked his beer and an occasional whiskey,” he and his wife Alice 
“came to believe that the abolition of strong drink could be in the national interest.” 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 621, 625.  Accordingly, Brandeis’ personal 
views and behavior changed during Prohibition.  “As Brandeis grew older, the ascetic streak 
in him strengthened, and he and Alice had no problem eliminating beer, wine, and whiskey 
from their household.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 625. 
108 “Brandeis’s commitment to upholding prohibition and federal enforcement authority” 
exhibited a “breathtaking intensity.” Post, Federalism, supra note 77, at 137 n.451.  See gen-
erally Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920); 
Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 
U.S. 146 (1919); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921 532-35 (1984). 
109 Many of Brandeis’ ideas “seem in retrospect quaint.” POSNER, CARDOZO, supra note 
100, at 140.  Given the breadth of Brandeis’ jurisprudence and the values he appealed to—
democracy, freedom, localism, etc.—many elements of his jurisprudence remain perennials 
and others are periodically revived. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal 
Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 186-90 (1996). 
110 E.g., STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 335 (referring to “Brandeis’s 
belief that unlimited human advancement can be furthered by legislation.”).  Brandeis’ faith 
was, however, hardly naive.  In 1922, for example, he warned a friend not to “pin too much 
faith in legislation” for a quite modern reason. “Remedial institutions are apt to fall under the 
control of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression.” Letter from Louis D. 
Brandeis to Robert Walter Bruere (Feb. 25, 1922), in V LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 45 
(Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978). 
111 E.g., Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
112 E.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 404 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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against both “bigness” and corporations remain alive, they have al-
most completely lost legal and constitutional salience.  Even during 
Brandeis’ lifetime, his attitudes on those subjects seemed unusual if 
not extreme,113 and since his retirement national corporations have 
not only become ever more deeply embedded in American life but, 
more recently, ever more solicitously protected by the Supreme 
Court.114 
Worse, some of Brandeis’ judicial actions have been discard-
ed and now seem flatly unacceptable.  Few would defend his decision 
to join Holmes’ opinion in Buck v. Bell115 upholding a state law re-
quiring sterilization of “feeble-minded” institutionalized persons.116  
Indeed, only three fleeting years after Brandeis retired a unanimous 
Court in effect rejected the opinion he had joined and held a similar 
state law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.117  
Equally striking, commentators have severely criticized and often 
condemned his extensive political involvements while he was on the 
bench.  There seems to be a general agreement that those extra-
judicial efforts were at a minimum disingenuous if not improper and 
that, even if not clearly wrong in his day, are most likely unethical 
under contemporary standards of judicial conduct.118 
 
113 LOUIS GALAMBOS & BARBARA BARROW SPENCE, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS 
IN AMERICA, 1880-1940:  A QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1975) (arguing that 
even many Progressives had come to see large-scale corporate enterprise as consistent with 
their values). 
114 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Saved by the Supreme Court: Rescuing Corporate Ameri-
ca, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POL’Y 1 (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.asclaw.org/sites/default/files/Morrison_-_Saved_by_the_Supreme_Court.pdf.; 
Lee Epstein, William M. Landis, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1431-32 (2013); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular 
to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1738-47 (2014). 
115 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
116 Id. at 205. 
117 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).  Indicative of the way that such out-
moded decisions are frequently ignored, Melvin Urofsky’s massive biography of Brandeis 
relegates Buck to a footnote describing the case in the briefest terms and noting only that it 
“is now considered” a “notorious opinion.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 
874. 
118 Brandeis’ most recent and highly sympathetic biographer concluded that Brandeis 
“maintained a level of extrajudicial activity that, by current standards of judicial ethics, 
would be either impermissible or at best questionable in judgment.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 460.  For an indictment of Brandeis’ behavior in this regard, see 
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982), and for a defense, see Robert Cover, 
The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 (May 5, 1982).  For a review of 
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Even on First Amendment issues, constitutional law has 
moved well beyond Brandeis’ emphasis on the instrumental and rela-
tively narrow political grounds for upholding free speech.  For 
Brandeis, the First Amendment served primarily to protect democrat-
ic government and the right of citizens to engage in serious public 
discourse.119  By the late twentieth century, however, the Court was 
relying on the First Amendment to protect new and far wider catego-
ries of “self-expressive” speech and behavior, including nude danc-
ing120 and graphic sexual materials,121 subjects that would surely have 
shocked Brandeis and struck him as far outside the First Amend-
ment’s scope and purpose. 
Further, many of the Court’s more recent decisions expanding 
the scope of corporate speech rights exceed drastically the limits 
Brandeis would have welcomed.122  True, he joined the Court in us-
ing the First Amendment to protect newspaper corporations from 
special taxes directed against the press,123 but that decision was lim-
ited to publishing companies that, in his view, served a special demo-
cratic purpose in educating the electorate.124  The Court’s more recent 
expansions of corporate speech rights would surely have struck 
Brandeis as serving that function poorly or not at all.  “The sort of 
‘advocacy’ of which Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke,” then-Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist noted while dissenting in a corporate speech case in 
1980, “was not the advocacy on the part of a utility to use more of its 
 
some of the literature on the issue, see G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and 
Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 610-16 (1996). 
119 Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. 
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
120 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975). 
121 E.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 
153 (1974).  For a far broader view of that nature and function of free speech than Brandeis 
held, see, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE 
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1995). 
122 E.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  Most like-
ly, Brandeis would have joined the dissent by Justice White that was joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 802 (White, J., dissenting).  For recent developments, see, e.g., 
Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional 
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); Elizabeth M. Silvestri, Free Speech, Free 
Press, Free Religion? The Clash Between the Affordable Care Act and the For-Profit Secu-
lar Corporation, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257 (2015). 
123 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 248 (1936). 
124 Id. at 249-50. 
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product.”125 
First Amendment law has moved even farther from Brandeis’ 
jurisprudence in other ways as well.  The Court’s recent decisions in-
validating laws restricting campaign funding by corporations and, es-
pecially, its decision to adopt the narrowest possible definition of 
“corruption,” contradict Brandeis’ views on both the desirability of 
regulating campaign financing and the acute danger of political cor-
ruption.126  Similarly, the Court’s recent efforts to turn constitutional 
and statutory protections for religion into grounds for defeating both 
general social welfare measures and the legal rights of third persons 
are inconsistent with his views.127  In spite of his support for incorpo-
rating the First Amendment religious clauses into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Brandeis would have seen the rights they conferred as 
more limited and unable to restrict the general regulatory powers of 
the federal government in social and economic matters.128 
Race is an even more obvious area where both popular atti-
tudes and constitutional law have changed radically and consigned 
yet more parts of Brandeis’ jurisprudence to the distant past.  In 
 
125 Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 583, 595 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
126 McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014); Citizens United 
v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010). 
127 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-64 (2014) (exempting on 
statutory grounds closely-held corporations from obligations under the Affordable Care Act).  
On the current Court’s use of the First Amendment to defeat federal economic regulation and 
social programs, see Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133, 136 
(2016).  The interpretation of the religion clauses has generally changed as religious align-
ments and political coalitions have changed over the decades. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
& James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 
281-82 (2001).  For current efforts of right-wing Christian groups to use the First Amend-
ment, especially the free speech clause to shape public education, see KATHERINE STEWART, 
THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT’S STEALTH ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 
81, 83, 85 (2012). 
128 Brandeis joined Cardozo’s concurrence in Hamilton which assumed that the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. 293 U.S. 
at 265.  The opinion, however, stressed that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt indi-
viduals from normal obligations of the law.  “Never in our history has the notion been ac-
cepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to [military] ser-
vice . . . are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or in morals, from 
regulation by the state.” Id. at 267.  See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty & Adam D. Zenor, Corpo-
rate Free Exercise of Religion and the Interpretation of Congressional Intent: Where Will It 
End?, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 477-78, 482-83 (2015); see generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free-
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015).  Similarly, Brandeis would likely 
have strongly opposed the Court’s recent use of the First Amendment to trump the Estab-
lishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995); Good 
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). 
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Grovey v. Townsend,129 for example, Brandeis joined the Court in 
upholding the right of the Texas Democratic Party to hold an “all 
white” primary, a decision that the Court overruled only five years 
after he left the bench.130  More striking, in both Gong Lum v. Rice131 
and South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Kentucky132 
Brandeis joined opinions reaffirming the “separate-but-equal” doc-
trine then enshrined in the now-scorned case of Plessy v. Ferguson.133  
In Gong Lum, where the Court upheld the right of Mississippi to clas-
sify a young Chinese girl as “colored” and require her to attend a seg-
regated black school, Brandeis stood with the Court.134  More telling, 
in South Covington, where a majority upheld a law requiring racial 
segregation on an interstate rail line,135 three Justices did dissent, 
stressing the uncontested fact that the railway line in question crossed 
state lines.136  Even given that interstate context and a dissenting co-
hort of three other Justices, Brandeis still chose to stay with Plessy.137  
In sharp contrast to the passionate dissents he issued in Gilbert, 
Olmstead, and so many other cases, he simply went along in race 
cases and remained silent.138 
 
129 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935). 
130 Id. at 47; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944). 
131 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
132 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920). 
133 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330-35. 
134 Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 87. 
135 S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 252 U.S. at 404. 
136 “There is no conflict of testimony, and the record shows that the company was en-
gaged in the operation of a street railway system whose principal business was interstate 
commerce, carrying passengers between Cincinnati and Kentucky cities across the Ohio 
River.” Id. at 405 (Day, J., dissenting). 
137 In fairness, in a few cases Brandeis joined the Court in providing some protection for 
minorities.  Those cases, however, not only had the support of a majority of the other Justic-
es but they also involved either utterly indefensible abuses or laws that discriminated explic-
itly on the basis of race. E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923) (writing for seven 
Justices, Holmes reversed convictions of blacks subject to outrageously unfair trials); Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922) (holding unanimously that two Chinese immi-
grants claiming U.S. citizenship could not be deported without a due process hearing on the 
fact of their alleged citizenship).  By narrowing the focus and ignoring a great deal, Urofsky 
put the issue in the most positive light.  “All told, in nearly all the major cases involving Af-
rican-Americans in which he took part, Brandeis and a majority of the Court upheld the 
black petitioners.” UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 639.  For an example of 
some of the complexities in the race cases Brandeis participated in, see, e.g., Spillenger, 
Reading the Judicial Canon, supra note 2, at 147-48. 
138 Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REV. 859, 
895 (2001) (“Brandeis’ judicial record on racial issues pales in comparison with his demon-
strated commitment to civil and economic liberties” and “evinces a conscious avoidance of 
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Born and raised in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, Brande-
is had seemingly absorbed the views of most white Southerners of the 
day, racial views that few Progressives subsequently wished to chal-
lenge.139  Whatever the explanation for his racial jurisprudence, how-
ever,140 it is clear that Brandeis failed to use his judicial position to 
press for significant changes and that he accepted and enforced 
Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine.141  Thus, his jurisprudence in 
this area is far distant from contemporary views and contrary to the 
constitutional law that developed in the decades after Brown v. Board 
of Education.142 
If a bit less obvious, Brandeis’ views on gender equality seem 
equally outdated.  Although he came to support women’s suffrage 
and the opening of some new opportunities for women,143 his views 
were far from those that became common in the later twentieth centu-
ry.  Assuming a dominant role in his marriage, he retained many tra-
 
the race question (whenever such avoidance was possible) and a certain complicity in the 
continued subjugation of American blacks.”)).  Brandeis’ record was “disappointing with 
regard to the rights of black and Asian citizens and resident aliens.” STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE 
PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 330. 
139 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 20, 640.  In one of his private letters 
Brandeis attributed a view he scorned, that scientific truth could be determined by a vote, to 
a “darky preacher.” Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 12, 1935), in 
HALF BROTHER, supra note 50, at 563-64.  Whatever its impact, Brandeis’ Kentucky up-
bringing was apparently relatively liberal compared with the upbringing of most white 
Southerners.  BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 53-56. 
140 Baskerville suggests that Brandeis “remained silent” on matters of racial justice be-
cause “open advocacy of so unpopular a cause would prove to be the graveyard of his cam-
paigning reputation.” BASKERVILLE, supra note 24, at 286.  Strum suggests more legalistical-
ly that Brandeis’ race-related decisions may have been rooted in “[r]espect for state 
sovereignty and federalism.” STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 334.  For 
suggestions about other possible motives, see Bracey, supra note 138, at 905-09. 
141 “Neither the social contract [that Brandeis advocated] in the political sphere nor his 
proposed economic contract was addressed to the problem of status, equality, and the possi-
bility of self-fulfillment in a society whose governmental and private institutions reflected an 
ideology of racism and sexism.” STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, 
at 164.  On the widespread racial bias in the United States and on the Supreme Court itself in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly 
Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and “Federal 
Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2001-38 (2003). 
142 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
143 See, e.g., STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 163.  Brandeis, 
for example, made a special personal appeal to President Franklin Roosevelt to appoint 
Frances Perkins to the cabinet. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His Clerks, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 163, 181 (2010).  When the president did so, Brandeis explained that 
Perkins was “the best” and that it was “a distinct advance to have selected a woman for the 
Cabinet.” Id. 
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ditional and constrictive ideas about gender roles.144  Unlike his focus 
on the facts of industrial society and the practical problems of work-
ers, for example, he gave little heed to the social and economic facts 
that undergirded structures of gender inequality.145  Again, unlike the 
attention he gave to implementing other reforms, he gave scant atten-
tion to the practical problems involved in actually achieving gender 
equality in practice.146  “Brandeis seems to have assumed that suf-
frage would be a sufficient condition for true gender equality,”147 
Philippa Strum wrote, and he did not consider “how or whether one 
got into the workplace in the first instance.”148  Whether one sees his 
eponymous brief in Muller v. Oregon149 as marking Brandeis as a 
sexist, a clever advocate, or simply a man of his times, constitutional 
law has since discarded the argument that women need special pro-
tective labor legislation because of their destined child-bearing roles 
in society.150  More broadly, it has accepted the key principle that 
laws and practices involving alleged gender discrimination deserve a 
stricter form of judicial scrutiny.151 
Finally, Brandeis’ ideas of liberty and fundamental rights did 
not include claims for abortion, sexual freedom, or same-sex mar-
riage.152  One could suggest, of course, that his emphasis on protect-
 
144 LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 196 (1983); STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, 
supra note 50, at 163; STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY, 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 113, 124-26, 223-27, 365. 
145 STRUM, JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 128-31; UROFSKY, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 224, 594-95. 
146 UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 223-24. 
147 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164. 
148 STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164. 
149 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). 
150 Compare id. at 421-23 (upholding special statutory protection for female workers), 
with United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-200 (1991) (reject-
ing as discriminatory employer’s policy providing special “protection” for female workers).  
On issues of gender equality, Brandeis has fairly been described as “a man of his time” and 
“a product of his times.” STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 50, at 164; 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 10, at 364. 
151 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  For earlier decisions suggesting the 
need for greater protections against gender discriminations, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
152 Stressing certain of Brandeis’ statements and values, one could argue that his jurispru-
dence provides support for such recently recognized rights. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (purpose of government “to make men 
free to develop their faculties.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“the right to be let alone” is “the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men.”).  Justices did on occasion use Brandeis to support 
expansions of the right to privacy. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.12, 543, 
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ing the “privacy and freedom of the home”153 and his support for the 
Court’s decisions in both Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters154 
provided some support for the Court’s eventual decisions in those ar-
eas.  Even granted such a connection as a matter of abstract legal ar-
gument, however, it remains true that Brandeis’ own views fell far 
short of including—or almost certainly even imagining—that such 
matters were among the fundamental rights that the Constitution pro-
tected.155  His much different and far narrower view of fundamental 
rights is hardly surprising given the fact that during his lifetime the 
overwhelming majority of Americans were scandalized by ideas of 
sexual freedom and would have scorned the idea of providing consti-
tutional protection for either abortion or same-sex marriage.  In the 
past half-century, of course, all of those matters have come to receive 
constitutional protection.156 
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS, CAST-OFFS, AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Both Brandeis’ judicial contributions and his judicial cast-offs 
highlight the same fundamental truth.  The American Constitution 
is—as a matter of indisputable historical fact—a constitution of 
change.157  Brandeis’ enduring contributions to the nation’s constitu-
 
548-59, 551-52 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting & Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1961) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Such uses were, however, 
expansions that Brandeis neither had in mind nor would most likely have accepted. See, e.g., 
Blasi, supra note 66, at 672, 695-96; Farber, supra note 109, at 184-85. 
153 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
154 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
155 “It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not even consid-
ered the possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status 
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage.” United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
156 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (right to same-sex marriage); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (anti-sodomy law invalid); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(due process right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried 
people to possess contraception on the same basis as married couples); Griswold, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (right to privacy in sexual matters). 
157 Given the facts of constitutional history, “there’s no realistic alternative to a living 
constitution.” DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010).  Indeed, even the 
Constitution’s fundamental federal structure serves as an instrument of change. See, e.g., 
PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at ch.10; ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF 
WAR WITHIN (2011); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of 
Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2015). 
In moments of candor, the Court itself has acknowledged as much.  Most famously, Chief 
Justice John Marshall explained why a constitution could not properly be filled with innu-
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tional law are rooted in the fact that over the past century Americans 
have come to accept and honor many of his ideas and values, while 
his cast-offs spotlight the fact that over the same century Americans 
have passed over, discarded, or rejected many of his other ideas and 
values.  Both the contributions and the cast-offs underscore the reali-
ty of constitutional change and illuminate its nature. 
A. Brandeis and the Constitution of Change 
At the highest authoritative level, members of the Supreme 
Court add—even if only by the votes they cast—their own distinctive 
inputs to the body of constitutional law and help shape, however 
faintly, the prevailing vectors of constitutional change.158  We readily 
acknowledge, even if unintentionally, that fundamental truth when 
we speak of great Justices from Marshall and Story to the present.  
We regard Justices as great when they have left a distinct and endur-
ing imprint on the law, narrowing or eliminating older interpretations 
and directions while adding new and different ones.  We can and do 
 
merable details but should only mark out its “great outlines” and designate its “important 
objects.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).  All else should be inferred from 
those basic guidelines, he reasoned, and those inferences should properly change as circum-
stances and needs changed. Id. at 415.  The Constitution, Marshall explained, was “intended 
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.” Id.  In declaring that poll taxes in state and local elections violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Court acknowledged that: 
[t]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a 
particular era.  In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any 
more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what 
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).  “Notions of what constitutes 
equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.” Id.  Similarly, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the extent to which the Court has infused wholly new 
meanings into the Eleventh Amendment when he rejected legal arguments based on its text 
as a mere “straw man.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996).  The 
Court has adopted change explicitly in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. E.g., Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (amendment construed in light of nation’s “evolving 
standards of decency.”). 
158 KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (2004) (“The Court, in short, is a 
flashpoint or a crucible.  It sits at the center of the conjunctions, multiple orders, and inter-
currences that characterize the American political order, and, aware of its perpetually tenu-
ous claim to authority, a claim based precariously on its status as a law follower rather than a 
law creator, labors to reconcile them plausibly in light of concrete, often crosscutting goals 
(and often in the absence of them).  Only a developmental approach to American constitu-
tionalism can hope to capture these complicated dynamics.”). 
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argue about the pedigree, propriety, quality, wisdom, and conse-
quences of the changes each made, but we debate those qualities be-
cause each of the great Justices did change the law. 
When was the last time you heard a debate about the jurispru-
dence of most of the Justices who sat with Marshall and Story?  
Thomas Todd and Gabriel Duvall, for example, or Smith Thompson 
and Robert Trimble?  Or about some of the Justices who sat with 
Field, Miller, and Bradley after the Civil War?  William Strong and 
Ward Hunt, or William B. Woods and George Shiras?  Indeed, when 
was the last time you heard a debate about the contributions of many 
twentieth-century Justices?  Joseph McKenna and Horace Lurton, or 
Joseph R. Lamar and Edward Sanford?  James Byrnes and Harold 
Burton, or Sherman Minton and Charles Whitaker?  Each of those 
largely overlooked, if not forgotten, Justices shared one characteris-
tic: none left a noteworthy imprint on the Constitution. 
One of the many imprints Brandeis left was, in fact, an explic-
it openness about the need for and legitimacy of constitutional 
change.  “The prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment refers to 
infamous crimes—a term obviously inviting interpretation in harmo-
ny with conditions and opinions prevailing from time to time,” he 
wrote in United States v. Moreland.159  And the confinement at issue 
was allowable, he continued, because it was certainly not infamous 
“to-day.”160  In Olmstead he emphasized that “this Court has repeat-
edly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various 
clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the [F]athers could 
not have dreamed.”161  Indeed, he praised the Fathers for their em-
brace of change.  “Those who won our independence by revolution 
were not cowards,” he proclaimed.  “They did not fear political 
change.”162 
Quite explicitly, Brandeis’s jurisprudence was a jurisprudence 
of change.163  His characteristic insistence on the necessity of under-
 
159 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
160 Id. at 450-51 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
161 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing 
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co, 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North 
Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919); 
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925)). 
162 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see 
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151-54. 
163 It is worth noting, too, that one of the ironies of Brandeis’ legacy is that it highlights 
the fact that Brandeis himself changed while on the bench. Strum, Brandeis: The Public Ac-
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standing the facts was designed for that very purpose. 
But the cases which have most engaged the attention 
of the Court since the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the great development of interstate 
commerce present no dispute as to the meaning of 
words or clauses.  They deal with the application of 
admitted constitutional limitations to the varying and 
illusive facts of life.  Life implies growth.  Only 
change is abiding.  In order to reach sound conclusion 
in such cases, we must strive ceaselessly to bring our 
opinions into agreement with the facts ascertained.164 
The other characteristic elements of his jurisprudence served 
the same goal.  His justification for free speech, his emphasis on the 
promise of science and expertise, his insistence on the importance of 
experimentation, and his image of the states as laboratories were all 
parts of the same coherent vision.  Thus, for example, he not only 
urged courts to follow James Bradley Thayer’s highly deferential 
“rule of the clear mistake” in order to open more space for legislative 
innovations, but in doing so he also expanded the scope of Thayer’s 
rule by applying it to the review of state as well as to federal legisla-
tion, thus throwing even more doors open for such innovation.165  
There “must be power in [both] the states and the nation” he declared 
in his powerful dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,166 “to re-
mould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institu-
tions to meet changing social and economic needs.”167 
On a parallel path, Brandeis sought to encourage the Court it-
 
tivist and Freedom of Speech, supra note 42, at 661-63, 708-09 and passim.  His view of na-
tional authority, the First Amendment, judicial restraint, executive power, and the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment all changed during his tenure on the Court. 
164 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 151 (quoting an unpublished draft opinion in Stratton v. St. 
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. (1930)). 
165 PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 154-55.  On Thayer’s theory and its reformu-
lation by Brandeis and other Progressive jurists, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand: 
The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 884-96 (1995). 
166 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
167 Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Shortly before he became a Justice with the Court 
in 1916 Brandeis had forecast those views.  The “recent dissatisfaction with our law,” he 
then declared, was rooted in “the fact that it had not kept pace with the rapid development of 
our political, economic and social ideals.” Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, in BUSINESS – 
A PROFESSION 344, 347 (1933).  As a result, he continued, it was essential for lawyers and 
judges to study the social and economic world so they could properly and effectively address 
“the problems of today.” Id. at 362. 
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self to make constitutional changes by loosening the grip of stare de-
cisis and thereby encouraging judicial innovation.168  Dissenting in 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,169 he maintained that stare deci-
sis was not “a universal inexorable command” but, instead, merely a 
matter of “wise policy.”170  The decision to follow or overrule a prec-
edent was “entirely within the discretion of the court.”171  While it 
was generally better to follow precedent or wait for legislative action, 
he maintained, “in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where 
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this 
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.”172  The Court “bows 
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning . . . .”173  
Not surprisingly, he buttressed his claim with a characteristic asser-
tion: “the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical scienc-
es, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”174  Subsequently the 
Court has often invoked that principle, frequently citing yet another 
of his opinions that appeared in dissent.175 
B. Understanding the American Constitution of 
Change 
As a matter of history, the reality of constitutional change is 
undeniable, and one might think that everyone understands and ac-
cepts that fact.176  Many, however, bemoan such changes or deny 
their legitimacy, and in truth there are serious reasons for that reac-
 
168 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 150-52. 
169 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(joined by Stone and Roberts, JJ.). 
170 Id. at 405-06 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  See UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, supra note 5, at 192 (stating that “Brandeis was the first justice to suggest that the 
Court not feel completely bound by precedent.”).  See also LEE, supra note 23, at 39-40; 
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholar-
ship, and Decisionmaking [sic] in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1351-52 (2001). 
171 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
172 Id. at 406-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 407-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. at 408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
175 E.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 854-55 (1992) (opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter announcing the judgment of the Court); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 
(1991). 
176 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367 
(2009); MARK TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 39 (2d ed. 2015). 
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tion.177  If the Constitution changes in meaning and application, they 
argue, there is little or no point in having a written constitution.178  If 
the Constitution’s meaning and application change, they continue, 
there is no guarantee against erratic, subjective, and potentially radi-
cal and destructive changes.179  And those protesters surely have one 
undeniable truth in their corner: change does not necessarily mean 
change for the better, and it does not necessarily mean “progress,” 
however defined.  It just means change, and possibly change for the 
worse. 
Brandeis’ justly celebrated concurrence in Olmstead, which 
heralded the open nature of many constitutional provisions and the 
necessity of adapting them to changing times, illustrates the dan-
ger.180  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Brandeis declared, 
“do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting modern 
conditions,” and those governments could properly meet those “mod-
ern conditions” by enacting laws so innovative that a mere half centu-
ry earlier they “probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and 
oppressive.”181  The striking point about that statement is that as au-
thority to support it Brandeis cited Buck v. Bell,182 the decision he had 
joined the prior year upholding the supposedly “modern” idea pro-
moted by the then-prominent eugenics movement that the “feeble-
minded” should be sterilized.183  The Court repudiated that decision 
 
177 On the complexities of constitutional interpretation and some of the reasons for criti-
cizing theories of change or denying the legitimacy of interpretative change, see generally 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 321 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
178 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of eco-
nomic events.  We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be 
construed in the light of the present.  If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of 
living words that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite 
true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they 
did not mean when written -- that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they 
would have applied then--is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it 
in force as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it oth-
erwise.”). 
179 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 24 (1985) (stating that “the idea that constitutions must evolve to meet changing 
circumstances is an invitation to destroy the rule of law.”). 
180 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
181 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). 
182 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
183 Id. at 207-08.  The decision had strong social support at the time, as the eugenics 
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shortly after Brandeis left the bench,184 and it is now widely discred-
ited.  The fact that Brandeis cited such a now-rejected decision as 
positive support for the desirability of constitutional change and ad-
aptation, however, stands as a stark reminder that the reasons ad-
vanced for change are not always sound, that calls for change are not 
always benevolent, and that change itself might well prove unwise 
and harmful. 
Ultimately, then, there are no guarantees, and there are surely 
no guarantees in Brandeis’ jurisprudence.185  Those who seek guid-
ance from his legacy are likely to come to different conclusions in 
different cases because his jurisprudence—like the Constitution it-
self—incorporates fundamental and irresolvable tensions.186  Brande-
is’ jurisprudence prizes certain values, but it also acknowledges both 
that those values have limits and that they may sometimes conflict.  
Thus, it urges the courts to both exercise judicial restraint and prac-
tice judicial boldness, to both encourage legislative experimentation 
and protect fundamental rights, to both uphold the common good and 
safeguard individual liberties, to both defer to actions of other gov-
ernmental institutions and review those actions with exacting scruti-
ny.187  Brandeis’ jurisprudence, in other words, highlights enduring 
 
movement was prominent in the United States in the 1920s and claimed many followers, in-
cluding prominent scientists and leading Progressives. See, e.g., Susan Currell, Eugenic De-
cline and Recovery in Self-Improvement Literature of the Thirties, in POPULAR EUGENICS: 
NATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND AMERICAN MASS CULTURE IN THE 1930’S 44 (Susan Currell & 
Christina Cogdell eds., 2006); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND 
THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 97 (1998); THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: 
RACE, EUGENICS AND AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 111-12 (2016); PAUL 
A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
BUCK V. BELL 174 (2008); DONALD PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES (1968); David 
A. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transi-
tional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029, 2036 (2014). 
184 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942). 
185 Even a Brandeisian reliance on “the facts” provides no guarantees, as “facts” may not 
actually be relevant—or even “facts”—and “scientific” theories may be flawed, misapplied, 
or simply unfounded.  “Brandeis briefs” were used in the early twentieth century, for exam-
ple, to support various forms of racial segregation and discrimination by bringing before the 
courts “scientific” evidence of the racial inferiority of blacks and the dangers of race-mixing. 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 
1870-1970 53-55, 66-68 (2015). 
186 Brandeis’ opinions are understandably cited in support of many arguments in many 
cases, but quite commonly the Justices disagreed as to their relevance, weight, and applica-
tion.  See, e.g., the cases cited, supra notes 4, 41, 176, 188. 
187 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens sparred 
over the significance of Brandeis’ principles in New State, where Brandeis praised the states 
as laboratories, and his position in Whitney, where he defended free speech. 530 U.S. 640, 
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values, illuminates critical tensions, and illustrates methodical and 
fact-based reasoning, but it can settle few if any of the newly pressing 
controversies that divide Americans in the present and that will surely 
divide them in the future. 
If there are no guarantees from Brandeis’ jurisprudence, there 
are equally no guarantees from anyone else’s.  Indeed, there are none 
from the United States Constitution itself.  Thus, we confront the ul-
timate truth: The American Constitution and the vital tradition it has 
inspired have combined to offer many guides that limit, channel, and 
point, but they ultimately require each generation of Americans to 
understand, evaluate, and apply those guides according to their own 
best lights in the context of altered conditions and novel challenges. 
Most American constitutionalists have accepted the fact of 
constitutional change and seek to identify reasonable and authorita-
 
660-61 (2000).  Justice Stevens dissented and invoked New State Ice, while Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the Court, rejected the applicability of New State Ice and invoked Whitney instead. Id. 
at 660-61, 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The same conflict between those counterpoised 
principles occurred in Chandler v. Miller, in which Justice Ginsburg cited Brandeis’ dissent 
in Olmstead to support her majority opinion, while Chief Justice Rehnquist countered by cit-
ing Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice. 520 U.S. 305, 322, 324 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting).  In Arizona v. Evans, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority and cited 
Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice. 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).  However, Justice Stevens and Jus-
tice Ginsburg dissented separately, with Stevens citing Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead and 
Ginsburg citing Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander. Id. at 18, 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Poe v. Ullman illustrates the inherent tension between Brandeisian activism and Brandeisian 
restraint. 367 U.S. 497 (1961)  Justice Felix Frankfurter, when considering whether the 
plaintiffs had a fundamental right to contraceptives under the Due Process Clause, wrote for 
the plurality of four Justices and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for lacking “the immediacy 
which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication.” Id. at 508.  Frankfurter 
also cited Brandeis’ opinion in Ashwander and stressed the importance of judicial restraint, 
along with the need to avoid reaching constitutional issues “in advance of the strictest neces-
sity.” Id. at 503. In contrast, Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court’s other leading “con-
servative,” dissented and explained that the Court’s judgment “does violence to established 
concepts of ‘justiciability.’ ” Id. at 522-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan cited Brandeis by 
name in three different places and quoted from Brandeis’ opinions in both Gilbert and 
Olmstead, terming the latter “the most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty” 
that undergirded the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Along 
with other precedents, Brandeis’ opinions supported the proposition “that the Constitution 
protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character,” 
and “the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital 
privacy . . . . ” Poe, 267 U.S. at 550, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Thus, such intrusion 
“marks an abridgment of important fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  There is substantial tension, for example, 
between Brandeis’ famous commitment to privacy and his insistence on the need for exten-
sive governmental investigatory power to enforce the law, especially against corporate inter-
ests. See KERSCH, supra note 158, at 56-60. 
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tive norms to determine when and why it is legitimate.  Strict “legal-
ists” adopt formalistic methods that strive to cabin and legitimate 
change by portraying it as, in some essential sense, not truly change, 
but instead only the result of implicit and logical exfoliations from 
unchanging constitutional principles.188  Such approaches, employing 
varieties of flexible word play, thus accept change by giving it a dif-
ferent name and masking the awkward facts of history with the 
smothering blanket of blinkered legal formalism.189 
Less formalistic and more realistic constitutionalists accept 
and often emphasize the fact of change, adding to the role of constitu-
tional text, structure, and doctrine the shaping force of changing so-
cial conditions, cultural values, and political movements.190  At the 
same time, however, they also seek to both justify and ultimately 
constrain such change by integrating it into some broader normative 
vision that offers a reasoned connection to the Constitution.191  Some 
emphasize fundamental moral principles that they find embedded in 
the Constitution and justify change when it accords with those moral 
norms.192  Others justify change by socializing and institutionalizing 
 
188 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. L. REV. 1243, 1264 
(2010). 
189 Felix Frankfurter adopted a version of this approach when he defended the New Deal’s 
broadened use of the commerce power.  He argued that economic changes “bring into play 
the affirmative possibilities of the authority over commerce granted to Congress” while 
warning against questioning the supremacy of law’s internal logic.  Any attempt to interpret 
trends in American constitutional history outside the frame of professed doctrine, he de-
clared, “calls for the utmost wariness.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER 
MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 8 (1937). 
190 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72 (stating “[w]hat [U.S.] constitutional history 
shows, though, is that understanding the Constitution as it is requires us to pay relatively lit-
tle attention to the written Constitution, somewhat more attention to the way in which the 
courts interpret the written Constitution, and a great deal of attention to the organization of 
politics by political parties under presidential leadership and to the principles that dominant 
parties and their presidents articulate.”). 
191 TUSHNET, supra note 176, at 271-72. 
192 Although not a historian, Ronald Dworkin has repeatedly insisted that constitutional 
issues and judgments must be grounded in sound judgments of moral philosophy. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
3 (1996).  The leading constitutional scholar of an earlier generation, Edward Corwin, made 
essentially the same point: “[T]he Supreme Court is vested with substantially complete free-
dom of choice [in construing the constitution, but w]ith this freedom there goes inevitably an 
equally broad moral responsibility.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 182 (1934) (emphasis in original).  As 
a more recent scholar wrote, changes are justified when they make “substantive contribu-
tions to the noblest causes that human institutions can and therefore should be made to 
serve.” Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE 
L.J. 2039, 2075 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction]. 
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it within the governmental structures that the Constitution establishes, 
especially the Article III judiciary.193  One version of the latter ap-
proach emphasizes the channeling power of established legal doc-
trines that work themselves out slowly through those constitutionally 
ordained institutions.194  Another version stresses the dual restraining 
and adapting powers of a deeply ingrained tradition of careful and 
small-step common-law judging.195  Both tend to downplay the direct 
impact of external political developments on constitutional interpreta-
tion and highlight what they consider as the tenaciously constraining 
and channeling force of the law’s internal elements.196 
Yet other constitutionalists place greater weight on external 
social and political forces197 and justify constitutional change by root-
ing it not only in a reasoned connection with the Constitution but, 
 
193 Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction, supra note 192, at 2049. 
194 E.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW 
DEAL 31 (2000). 
195 HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 127 (1990) (stating that “the common-law method of consti-
tutional adjudication . . . better explains the Supreme Court’s role in American government” 
than originalism or other theories and “has the advantage of building change into law, 
change that takes into account contemporary substantive values as well as participation[ ] 
values.”).  Accord STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 3-4, 118; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many 
and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 
1815 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication]. 
196 Disputes about the relative importance of internal and external forces on constitutional 
change and on the Supreme Court’s decision making are unanswerable as a general matter 
and can only be resolved in terms of specific times, places, issues, judges, and decisions, and 
then only to the extent that there is adequate evidence in the historical record. See, e.g., Ed-
ward A. Purcell, Jr., National League of Cities: Judicial Decision-Making and the Nature of 
Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENVER U.L. REV. 179, 179-80 (2014). 
197 In explaining constitutional change, for example, some versions stress the role of mass 
social movements. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064 
(2002); William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? 
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994); 
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1326-27 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Siegel, Constitutional Culture].  Other versions highlight the driving role of “transforma-
tive” presidencies. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: 
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 265 (2005) (explaining 
that the election of popular presidents with new political mandates created “a recurring insti-
tutional dynamic” that repeatedly led the Court to take on “the arduous task of creating a liv-
ing constitutional law . . . . ”); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: 
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON, at xiv (1997) (explaining that “[m]y case 
for the presidency is that it has been a singularly persistent source of change, a transforma-
tive element engrained in the Constitution itself.”). 
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more directly, in the Constitution’s underlying principle of popular 
sovereignty.198  One variation argues that over time the Court finds 
legalistic ways to adapt constitutional law to the prevailing views and 
values of the American people and that constitutional change is justi-
fied by popular approval from below.199  A second variation focuses 
more narrowly on the rise of new political coalitions that come to 
dominate the institutions of government through popular elections, 
thereby establishing new “regimes” with distinctive constitutional 
values that are buoyed by widespread popular support.200  A third var-
iation incorporates “originalist” elements and argues that the Consti-
tution establishes a structural “framework” for democratic politics, 
but leaves most substantive policy issues open for determination by 
democratic political developments in the future.201  A fourth and 
somewhat more formally normative variation confers on certain ma-
jor changes an express constitutional legitimacy, identifying special 
“moments” when particularly powerful and sustained popular move-
 
198 Of course, virtually all American constitutionalists base their theories in one way or 
another on the Constitution’s principle of popular sovereignty, but the key question always 
remains how exactly they explain the connection.  “Originalist” theories, for example, com-
monly argue that the text of the Constitution as understood by the founders and ratifiers is 
the only proper basis for constitutional interpretation because it is only the text itself that has 
been approved by the people.  For one statement of this idea, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 128-29 (1999). 
199 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 365-68.  See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 247-48 (2004).  As Ed-
ward S. Corwin wrote in challenging the idea that the Supreme Court was the Constitution’s 
sole authoritative voice, “judicial review is a process of popular government.” EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 176 (Peter Smith 1957) (1938). 
200 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at ix 
(2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court is best understood “as part of a ruling regime do-
ing its bit to implement the regime’s policies.  Some of its most historically controversial 
decisions seem far less controversial when set within the politics of the time.  Justices are, 
after all, subject to the same economic, social, and intellectual currents as other upper-
middle-class professional elites.”).  The classic statement of “regime” theory appears in 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Poli-
cy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-80 (1957).  See Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial 
Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
511, 519 (2007). 
201 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
641, 646 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, The New Originalism] (stating that such “framework 
originalism is both originalist and compatible with a living Constitution.”).  See also JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 10, 12 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 456-58 (2013); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE 
L.J. 408, 449 (2007). 
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ments lead the nation’s political institutions to accept de facto chang-
es as validly adopted constitutional amendments.202 
In spite of their sometimes substantial differences, all those 
theories accept the fact of constitutional change, and they understand 
that change—with varying emphases—as a culturally-rooted, institu-
tionally channeled, professionally disciplined, morally guided, and 
politically molded reality.  Thus, in their light, it is entirely under-
standable why, as a general matter, Brandeis’ jurisprudence would 
almost necessarily produce both contributions and cast-offs and why, 
as a particular matter, only specific historical analysis—not the 
words, text, or principles of the Constitution—can truly explain the 
origin and fate of each of those contributions and each of those cast-
offs. 
C. Denying the Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: 
Originalism 
Some other commentators, however, acknowledge the fact of 
constitutional change but vigorously condemn it.203  The view “that 
the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this 
Court is charged with a duty to make those changes,” Justice Hugo L. 
Black declared, was profoundly wrong.204  Justice Black stated that 
“[f]or myself, I must with all due deference reject that philosophy.”205  
The founding fathers “knew the need for change,” he explained, and 
they provided in Article V’s formal amendment process the only 
proper method for making such changes.206 
 
202 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 92-93 (1991); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 312 (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3 (2014). 
203 EPSTEIN, supra note 179, at 281 (stating that “[t]he New Deal is inconsistent with the 
principles of limited government and with the constitutional provisions designed to secure 
that end.”) (emphasis in original); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 9 
(2012) (explaining that a “dynamic began to unfold in the 1870s and accelerated thereafter,” 
and in the New Deal the “Supreme Court abandoned the [earlier] competitive rules and in-
stead embraced a constitutional order that facilitates the formation of state cartels . . . . ”).  
See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, at x-xi 
(2006) (discussing that “standard interferences with employment contracts, such as mini-
mum wage laws, antidiscrimination laws (in competitive markets only), collective bargain-
ing laws, and Social Security requirements [are] unconstitutional . . . . ”). 
204 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. (Black, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining “[t]hat method of change was good for our Fa-
thers, and being somewhat [old-fashioned] I must add it is good enough for me.”).  For a fur-
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Black’s position was hardly new.  Such originalist claims 
seem intrinsic to a legal system based on a written constitution, and 
from the Republic’s earliest years commentators have advanced them 
in one form or another to support a spectrum of claims.207  Such 
originalists assume that the Constitution today means what it meant 
to the founding generation and—their decisive claim—that its origi-
nal meaning can be identified and deployed to decide specific con-
temporary issues correctly.208 
The essence of the matter, however, is that such specifically 
directive originalism is wholly inadequate to justify its pretensions.209  
 
ther in-depth examination on Black and his jurisprudence, see generally GERALD T. DUNNE, 
HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A 
BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1994).  Justice Scalia took a position similar to Black’s in addressing the 
Eighth Amendment: 
Bound down, indeed.  What a mockery today’s opinion makes of Hamil-
ton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s conclusion that the meaning of 
our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years--not, mind you, that 
this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution 
has changed.  The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to 
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to “the 
evolving standards of decency,” of our national society . . . . Because I 
do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more 
than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be de-
termined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-
minded foreigners, I dissent. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted). 
207 See, e.g., R.B. BERNSTEIN, Legacies: What History Has Made of the Founding Fathers, 
in THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 115, 115-67 (2009); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, 
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1, 2 (2005).  One 
relatively recent form, related to the revival of libertarian and classical economic theory, in-
volves the claim that the Constitution is linked to classical “liberal,” market, social contract 
thinking. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 4, 6 (2014); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 5 (2014). 
208 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 843 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Craw-
ford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)) (explaining that “[t]he proper course of consti-
tutional interpretation is to give the text the meaning it was understood to have at the time of 
its adoption by the people.”).  Most originalists, however, also dilute their methodological 
claims in various ways, acknowledging although seldom specifying the limits of the dilution. 
See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 130 (2014) (discussing that Justice 
Scalia declared in his confirmation hearing, “I think that there are some provisions of the 
Constitution that may have a certain amount of evolutionary content within them . . . . ”).  
Some hybrid forms of “originalism,” especially those advanced since the 1980s, are far more 
modest and embrace the practice of adaptive and changing “interpretations” of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 201, at 10, 12; Balkin, The New 
Originalism, supra note 201, at 641. 
209 The literature identifying the inadequacies of originalism is vast.  The briefest sam-
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The issues that the Constitution clearly settles have long been settled, 
while those that it does not clearly settle have become the stuff of 
new or recurring constitutional debates, shifting constitutional under-
standings, and often changing constitutional law.210  Most, if not all, 
of the controversial and disputed issues that arise in the modern 
world fall into the latter category. 
Specifically directive “original” meanings either cannot be 
discovered at all or the shards of relevant evidence in the historical 
record prove too vague, obscure, diverse, oblique, limited, ambigu-
ous, or contradictory to provide clear and specific direction.211  Fur-
ther, the nation and the world have changed so drastically since the 
founding that many “original” meanings, even if they could be accu-
rately and clearly identified, would not have the practical significance 
in the twenty-first century that they were understood to have in the 
eighteenth.212  Revealingly, and as a result, originalists have produced 
no settled, consistent, and coherent methodology and have, instead, 
advanced a seemingly infinite variety of flawed—and usually elu-
sively qualified—theories, methods, and assumptions that have led to 
wide ranges of conflicting conclusions.213  Indeed, there seem nearly 
 
pling includes the following: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS (2002); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (2015); H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BASED ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND 
POLITICS (2002); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (2004); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311 (1996). 
210 Originalist arguments are, in fact, seldom decisive, and they are commonly paired with 
other types of arguments that range from the lofty philosophical to the bluntly practical. See, 
e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9-12 (1921); Fallon, Constitutional Adjudication, supra 
note 195, at 1760-63, 1770. 
211 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 133 (1996) (stating that “the very extent and diversity of the records of ratifi-
cation give intellectual license to a host of interpretative strategies . . . [f]rom such a body of 
writings, many an interpretation can be plausibly sustained, few conclusively verified or fal-
sified.”).  The Court sometimes acknowledges as much.  Justice Powell once wrote that “[a]t 
most, then, the historical materials show that--to the extent this question was debated--the 
intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers [of the Eleventh Amendment] were ambiguous.”). 
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84. 
212 The Supremacy Clause was “originally” intended to ensure that properly ratified trea-
ties trumped inconsistent state laws, but its meaning was altered over time and then changed 
radically in the twentieth century to accommodate profound changes in both the foreign rela-
tion needs of the United States and the domestic demands of American politics. See DAVID 
L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 27 
(2016). 
213 Some originalists acknowledge many of the differences that divide them.  For a de-
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as many originalisms as there are originalists, and deciding between 
any two versions of specifically directive originalism is like deciding 
which of Huck Finn’s raft mates, the Duke or the Dauphin, was of 
nobler birth. 
Equally to the point, and contrary to its advocates’ claims,214 
originalism does little or nothing to confine judicial discretion and 
limit subjective constitutional interpretation.215  Originalist arguments 
are commonly invoked by all sides in constitutional controversies, 
and they are readily adapted to support a wide range of conflicting 
positions.216  The sweeping spectacle of contemporary originalisms 
does little but confirm that originalist methodologies determine pre-
cious little, while the practical goals and ideological premises of their 
varying proponents determine almost all.217 
 
tailed discussion of different originalist theories, see Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political 
Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2012).  Compare, e.g., the disagreements between two 
self-proclaimed originalists: RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) with Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative 
Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1081 (2005).  See generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 239 (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional 
Theory, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111 (2015); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as 
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006). 
214 E.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 47-61; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863-64 (1989). 
215 The outcomes of cases are “based on ideology” rather than originalist sources and 
show “that originalism is no more constraining than alterative theories of interpretation.” 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 193 (2013).  See, e.g., Michael W. 
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 153, 163-64 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Pub-
lic Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 160 n.202 (1992).  
For an analogous argument about the inevitable need for value judgments in statutory inter-
pretation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist 
Theories of Statutory Interpretation--And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment 
Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014). 
216 Such divergent originalisms are hardly new.  Chief Justice John Marshall relied on 
originalist sources in defending the Second Bank of the United States, for example, while 
Spencer Roane, one of his principal adversaries, equally invoked originalist arguments to 
prove Marshall wrong. PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186.  The Chief Justice 
wound up charging that Roane’s view of the Constitution’s original meaning stemmed from 
“deep-rooted and vindictive hate,” while Roane retorted that Marshall’s interpretation 
proved him “a deplorable idiot.” PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 186.  For other 
classic examples of conflicting originalist arguments, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393, 405, 426-27 (1857), and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (majority opinion). 
217 CROSS, supra note 215, at 190-91 (stating that “[t]he study of the results of cases decid-
ed using the most prominent originalist sources suggests that the theory is not a meaningful 
one in the sense of determining case outcomes.  The justices all appear to fit those originalist 
sources to the support of their preferred resolution of the case.  Originalism is commonly 
manipulated.”).  In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy appealed to originalist sources in opposing 
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In fact, originalist methodologies and the historical materials 
that they cite are easily, commonly, and often purposely manipulat-
ed.218  Justice Black’s rejection of change by judicial interpretation, 
for example, was an act of high irony, for he was one of the Justices 
who radically changed the meaning and application of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.219  Similarly, the Court’s re-
cent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,220 commonly cited as 
a paradigmatic example of originalist reasoning, demonstrates the 
same point.221  There, the Justices divided sharply over the interpreta-
tion of scattered, diverse, conflicting, and inconclusive historical ma-
terials, with the two opposed sides interpreting their self-selected 
 
the conclusions of the dissenting Justice Scalia. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43, 745-46, 
752.  Similarly, in Citizens United, Justice Stevens dissented using an originalist argument, 
while Justice Scalia concurred and advanced an originalist counterargument supporting the 
Court’s decision. 558 U.S. 310, 385, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Compare, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) (proposing originalist interpretation), with AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE 
BY (2012) (modifying, and arguably departing from, originalist interpretation), and with 
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1084, 1086 
(2015) (explaining that “[c]orrecting originalism’s perceived shortcomings forces Amar to 
turn ever more intricate interpretative somersaults” and leaves him with “no limiting princi-
ple.”). 
218 Condemning the views of John Marshall and Daniel Webster, for example, John Tay-
lor of Caroline and John C. Calhoun, had no trouble proving that their extreme states’ rights 
doctrines represented the authentic original command of the Constitution. JOHN TAYLOR, 
TYRANNY UNMASKED 100 (F. Thornton Miller ed., 1992) (1822) (stating that broad construc-
tion of national powers renders the “true intention of the constitution inefficacious and nuga-
tory.”). See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the 
United States, in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 64, 
65 (Ross M. Lence ed. 1992) (explaining that to show that the Constitution did not establish 
a national government, “it will be necessary to trace the expression to its origin.”).  For a 
more recent example, see Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article 
III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 337-43 (2010) 
(describing Justice Frankfurter’s inconsistent and inaccurate use of appeals to the intent of 
the Framers). 
219 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89, 91-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment -- to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of 
Rights.”).  In Rochin v. California, Black reached his favored result by “torturing the Fifth 
Amendment.” 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); POWE, supra note 201, at 
227.  See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 
120-21 (1965). 
220 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 54 U.S. 570 (2008). 
221 Id. at 576-77.  See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND 
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 345-49 (2009); Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 218, at 1088, 1093. 
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shards through their opposed ideological lenses.222  Thus, specifically 
directive originalism only produces ever more fully weaponized—but 
radically conflicting—versions of the nation’s history and constitu-
tional law. 
To label Heller and similar decisions originalist reminds of 
the story about Lincoln asking his cabinet how many legs a dog 
would “have if you call[ed] its tail a leg.”  “Four,” Lincoln famously 
answered, for calling the tail a leg does not “make it a leg.”  Similar-
ly, calling an opinion originalist does not make it an opinion deter-
mined by originalist sources.  Heller, in fact, is inconceivable as a 
product of constitutional change absent the modern gun-rights 
movement, its avid embrace by the Republican Party, and its joint 
success in placing on the Supreme Court many ideological compatri-
ots.223 
Most important for understanding American constitutional-
ism, as Heller and other purportedly “originalist” decisions illustrate, 
is the fact that originalism is itself a doctrine of constitutional 
change.224  In essence, originalism is a rhetorical trope for those who 
seek to overturn prevailing meanings and understandings in the name 
of allegedly older ones.225  The fact is, however, that those allegedly 
 
222 STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 20 (stating that Heller was as a paradigmatic example of 
“[w]hen historical materials are vague or confused, as they routinely will be, there is an 
overwhelming temptation for a judge to see in them what the judge wants to see in them.”).  
For the arbitrary rhetorical move that anchored the Court’s reasoning, see Steven L. Winter, 
Frame Semantics and the ‘Internal Point of View,’ in 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 2011 115, 119-20 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013). 
223 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191-95 (2008).  Not surprisingly, Heller’s result is fully con-
sistent with the insistent personal values of the opinion’s author. BISKUPIC, supra note 222, at 
345-46, 363.  Indicative of the manipulability of originalist reasoning and the pressing force 
of judicial ideology, consider the position of Heller’s author on substantive due process, 
where he argued that such rights should be limited to their “most specific level” of meaning. 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).  Applying that principle, an original-
ist could readily conclude that the right recognized in Heller should be limited to the keeping 
of muzzle-loading, ball-firing, single-shot firearms. 
224 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 202, at 11 (stating that “[m]ost successful 
political and social movements in America’s history have claimed authority for change in 
just this way: either as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution or as a 
call for fulfillment of those principles.”). 
225 Modern, specifically directive “originalism” flourished within the Republican Party as 
a political jurisprudence designed to undermine post-New Deal liberalism and the decisions 
of the Warren Court.  By claiming that eighteenth- and nineteenth- century attitudes deter-
mined constitutional meaning, conservatives believed they could strengthen their legal and 
historical arguments against the things they opposed: gay rights, abortion, gun control, af-
firmative action, social welfare programs, restrictions on the death penalty, expansive tort 
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older “original” meanings and understandings are either too vague 
and indeterminate to carry the weight claimed for them, or they have 
been specifically and selectively retrofitted to advance the particular 
contemporary goals and purposes of their current advocates. 
It is no surprise, then, that when the New Deal Court changed 
the law, it sometimes did so in the name of “restoring” the Constitu-
tion’s original meaning.226  Nor that when the Warren Court changed 
the law, it too sometimes used originalist rhetoric to help justify those 
changes.227  Nor, most recently, that when the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts changed the law, they also sometimes claimed originalist jus-
tifications.228  All show that originalism is simply another method of 
legal argument, employed when serviceable, sometimes invoked and 
sometimes ignored, and functioning to sustain, while seeking to mask 
and deny, the reality of American constitutionalism.229  Thus, there is 
no realistic question about choosing between a “living” and an 
“originalist” constitutionalism, only the question of choosing what 
kind of changing constitutionalism Americans wish to acknowledge 
and accept.230 
 
liability, rigid separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad federal 
anti-discrimination laws. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal 
Constitution, 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920--), 127, 161-62 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008).  See generally CROSS, supra note 216. 
226 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality 
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 56-57 (1993).  Felix Frankfurter presented 
a classic example of New Deal “restorationism:”  “After a brave effort to confine the New 
Deal,” he wrote, “the old Court surrendered in the spring of 1937--and returned to the Mar-
shall-Taney-Waite view of national power.” Allen R. Kamp, Constitutional Interpretation 
and Technological Change, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 201, 219 n.150 (2015) (citing 
FRANKFURTER, supra note 190, at 116). 
227 The Warren Court “used originalist sources quite frequently, more so than did previous 
Courts,” though its “apparent reliance on originalism in some cases may simply have been as 
a rhetorical tool in service to an outcome-oriented agenda.” CROSS, supra note 216, at 96.  
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1, 22-23 (1998); Kelly, supra note 220, at 125. 
228 CROSS, supra note 216, at 98; Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 29 n.74 (2009); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 691, 713 (2009). 
229 Accord Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 649-50; Colby & Smith, su-
pra note 214, at 307 (stating that originalism “is in fact a loose collection of a staggering ar-
ray of often inconsistent approaches to constitutional interpretation.  And the approaches 
themselves continue to change and evolve, sometimes too fast for anyone to keep up.  
Originalists might despise the notion of a ‘living constitution,’ but they have gone a long 
way toward creating a living constitutionalism of their own--the very existence of which un-
dermines much of their own rhetorical and normative claims to superiority.”). 
230 Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 202, at 718-19.  Of course the Constitution is 
not “living,” and it is not an “organism,” as common metaphorical usages might seem to 
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Specifically directive originalism thus purports to make the 
Constitution something that it is not and cannot be, a predetermined 
mandate for future times and the foundation of an unchanging consti-
tutional law.  Its ultimate flaw, then, is that in proposing to address 
modern controversies it counsels us most unwisely, urging us to turn 
from grappling with the pressing challenges of the present to confect-
ing subjectively imagined mandates from the past. 
V. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE TRUE ORIGINALISM 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
While the Constitution fails to settle most new and controver-
sial issues, it is helpful to remember that it also failed to settle a great 
many other issues and that only subsequent social and political de-
velopments were able to settle some, but not all, of those.231  The 
Constitution did not settle the principle that Congress had the power 
to create the First and Second Banks of the United States.232  The 
evolution of the party system, the disastrous war of 1812, the growth 
of the nation’s economy, the conversion of James Madison, and the 
presence of Marshall and Story on the Supreme Court had far more to 
do with settling that issue than anything in the Constitution itself.233  
 
suggest.  The Constitution instead is the written foundation of American constitutionalism, a 
tenacious and evolving practice that seeks to maintain fidelity to its text, principles, struc-
tures and values while interpreting, shaping, and applying them in adaptive, effective, and 
desirable ways. 
231 Examples could be endlessly multiplied.  For example, despite its explicit textual man-
date, the Constitution did not even settle the principle that treaties were the “supreme Law of 
the Land.” U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.  To the contrary, the emergence of the United States as 
a world power, the complexities of international relations, and intense political opposition to 
the emergence of movements for international human rights and domestic civil rights settled 
the quite different principle--manifestly contrary to the facial command of the constitutional 
text--that treaties are supreme law only under certain special and highly circumscribed polit-
ical conditions. Martin S. Flaherty, Global Power in an Age of Rights: Historical Commen-
tary, 1946-2000, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE, 416, 420, 422-23, 426 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey, & William S. Dodge 
eds., 2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
232 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324 (1819). 
233 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 24 JANUARY TO 31 
MARCH 1791 275, 276 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).  See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Introduction to 
JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1, 3-8 (Gerald 
Gunther ed., 1969) (showing the exchange between John Marshall and Spencer Roane over 
the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States.).  Opponents of both banks 
developed elaborate constitutional and originalist arguments against their constitutionality. 
See, e.g., Mr. James Madison, Remarks from Debate in the House of Representatives (Feb. 
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The Constitution did not settle the principle that the Union was per-
manent and that states could not secede.234  The slavery controversy, 
the election of Abraham Lincoln, and Northern victory in the Civil 
War settled that principle.235  The Constitution did not settle the prin-
ciple that presidents could conclude binding agreements with foreign 
nations without the Senate’s approval.236  Economic expansion, the 
demands of international commerce, practicalities of conducting for-
eign policy, and the emergence of an increasingly powerful executive 
branch settled that principle.237  Indeed, the three Civil War Amend-
ments did not settle the principle that governments are required to ac-
cord full equality to all Americans or that racial discrimination and 
disenfranchisement are unconstitutional.238  Only massive social 
changes, the Second World War, the emergence of a vigorous Civil 
Rights Movement, and profound shifts in American politics and cul-
ture settled—albeit still quite imperfectly—those principles.239 
What, in fact, the Constitution itself did originally—and still 
does—is essentially five things, none of which is to provide specific 
direction in resolving most, if any, seriously controverted modern is-
sues.  The Constitution establishes the nation’s complex structure of 
 
2, 1791), in A SECOND FEDERALIST: CONGRESS CREATES A GOVERNMENT 126 (Charles S. 
Hyneman & George W. Carey eds., 1967). 
234 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700-01 (1868). 
235 Id. at 727-28. 
236 Craig Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International 
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 347 (1955). 
237 Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901-1945, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 232, at 217-18, 220-22.  Similarly, the Constitution did not settle the princi-
ple that the executive can terminate treaties, but that principle has gradually become estab-
lished. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 
773 (2014). 
238 Baldly ignoring history in an effort to reconcile originalism with the principle of racial 
equality, Justice Scalia argued that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “leave no 
room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid.” Rutan 
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  As a matter of 
historical fact, those amendments were understood for some seventy-five years to allow per-
vasive racial discrimination and abuse in the United States.  As late as 1959, after Brown v. 
Board of Education, for example, William F. Buckley argued in lofty philosophical terms 
that the South had the right to disenfranchise blacks notwithstanding the language of the 
Constitution. WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., UP FROM LIBERALISM 126-27, 129-30 (1959).  Invok-
ing such an abstract and ahistorical fiat illustrates the plasticity and manipulability of 
originalist arguments. See Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist 
Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 183-84 
(2014). 
239 E.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3-6 (2004). 
43
Purcell: The Judicial Legacy of Louis Brandeis
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
48 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
checking governmental institutions; it prescribes certain basic politi-
cal and institutional principles such as representative government; it 
affirms the inspiring ideal of reasoned and limited constitutional gov-
ernment; it mandates certain republican political and moral values; 
and it stands as a paramount and compelling symbol of national unity 
and human community.240  Its brilliance—and ultimately its inherent 
risk—lies precisely in the fact that it constrains and channels, but 
does not direct.  Thus, it not only allows change but embraces it, 
while at the same time mandating as well as words can that such 
change come through the structures it establishes, comports with the 
principles it enshrines, and ultimately meets the approval of the peo-
ple it governs. 
Thus, while originalism as a specifically directive method of 
constitutional interpretation is a chimera, originalism in a far different 
and more realistic sense is vital.  American constitutionalism is based 
on a shared communal faith that the Constitution is binding and au-
thoritative and that the understandings of its framers and ratifiers may 
prove important guides in understanding its meaning, applying its 
principles, and honoring its values.241  At a deeply embedded social 
and cultural level, such a communal belief is a core component of 
American life, law, and government and a profound source of the na-
tional unity.  Indeed, this seems the Constitution’s most commonly 
recognized virtue, one that scholars on all sides embrace.242  That 
 
240 PURCELL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 19, at 196-200. 
241 Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, for example, certainly no originalist, nonetheless fol-
lowed traditional constitutional argumentation when he invoked “ ‘the free exercise’ of reli-
gion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the nation.” Hamilton v. Regents of the 
Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
242 Not surprisingly, James Madison understood the point.  The Constitution, he declared 
in his first inaugural address in 1809, was “the cement of the Union.” James Madison, Inau-
gural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 47, 49 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed. 1908); STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 101 (explaining that “[t]he written Constitution is 
valuable because it provides a common ground among the American people, and in that way 
makes it possible for us to settle disputes that might otherwise be intractable and destruc-
tive.”).  More recently, James Boyd White made the point from the perspective of language 
and rhetoric. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS 
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 246 (1984) (discussing 
that the Constitution “establishes a new conversation on a permanent basis” and thus “consti-
tutes a rhetorical community.”).  For contemporary views, see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 
218, at 1113 (explaining that “[b]y encouraging fidelity to the original bargain that created 
and renewed the Union, originalism can help to keep that Union alive and well.”); Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, supra note 198, at 1419 (stating that “[w]hen citizens who passion-
ately disagree about the terms of collective life can advance their contending visions as the 
outworking of the nation’s founding commitments, they belong to a common community, 
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communal faith underwrites a sustaining conviction that Americans 
share fundamental premises even though, in ever-recurring constitu-
tional disputes, they proceed by drawing from those premises nar-
rower, more particular, and more immediately serviceable principles 
that allow them to justify sharply conflicting conclusions.243  That 
true communal originalism is not a method of finding specific direc-
tion on controverted issues, but part of the social and institutional 
glue that helps hold the American people together and induces them 
to debate rather than fight. 
Thus, the reality of this communal originalism is a fundamen-
tal element of the answer to the question that many of those who de-
ny the legitimacy of constitutional change seem to regard—quite 
wrongly—as unanswerable: To repeat their question: What is the 
point of a written constitution if its meanings and interpretations 
change?244  The answer—entirely accurate as a matter of the nation’s 
history and crucial to an understanding of its constitutionism—is that, 
together with its other establishing contributions, the written Consti-
tution helps knit Americans together in their common effort to main-
tain a free, open, tolerant, and democratic society.  It undergirds a 
collective national enterprise in democratic self-government anchored 
in efforts to interpret its text, structure, and principles in ways that al-
low the American people to share a bonding sense of common values 
while vigorously and sometimes bitterly disputing the policies neces-
sary to confront the challenges of an ever-changing world.245 
To understand American constitutionalism in this manner 
helps develop a deeper understanding not just of Americans in the 
past, but of ourselves in the present.  It is a method that urges us to 
try to understand how we come to embrace the values we hold and, 
consequently, why we adopt the constitutional views we espouse.  It 
is especially important for Justices on the United States Supreme 
Court, for if they would be truly wise and properly restrained, they 
 
despite deep disagreement about its ideal form.”). 
243 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 302 (2008) (stating that “in most constitu-
tional disputes, the disputants are not arguing from common premises.”). 
244 As Justice Black stated the point, the idea that the Constitution’s meaning changes over 
the years is “an attack” on the very “concept of a written constitution.” GARY L. MCDOWELL, 
EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 129 (1982). 
245 Constitutional change sometimes occurs through the formal amendment process, but 
this is relatively rare and frequently of lesser importance, as amendments often function in 
large part to ratify social and attitudinal changes that have already occurred or are substan-
tially underway. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 157, at 115-18. 
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must first understand not just the law, but themselves.246  They must 
strive to understand why exactly they hold certain personal views and 
values, how many of those views and values were shaped by sources 
outside the Constitution, and how some of those views and values 
have in turn helped shape their understanding of the Constitution it-
self.  Above all, they must strive to understand how those views and 
values may—consciously or unconsciously, properly or improperly—
press them to shape the law in their service.  Surely, no candid and 
self-conscious judge could possibly consider him or herself as merely 
a non-discretionary “umpire” calling balls and strikes in accord with 
some pre-existing and objective standard.247 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Louis Brandeis understood both the underlying communal 
function of the Constitution and the institutional tensions it structured 
in channeling conflict and enabling reasoned and ordered change.  
His jurisprudence embraced that communal function while seeking to 
utilize those institutional tensions to the nation’s best advantage.  One 
can fairly criticize many aspects of his career and jurisprudence, in-
cluding the methods he used, the values he cherished, the goals he 
sought, the reasons he advanced, and the judgments he reached.  One 
cannot fairly criticize him, however, for attempting—within the lim-
ited confines of his judicial role—to articulate reasoned constitutional 
arguments supported by empirical evidence and practical insight to 
adapt the law to meet what he considered the most pressing needs of 
the nation, its people, and its democratic government. 
To one degree or another, all Justices have done that, even if 
they were largely or wholly unaware of the way their personal views 
and values were shaping their constitutional thinking.  All the truly 
“great” Justices have also done that, too, but they—like Brandeis—
have done so by and large consciously and purposely.  That truth 
stands—for good as well as possible ill—as an intrinsic, dynamic, 
and fundamental element of American constitutionalism. 
 
 
246 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Ju-
risprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 418-
19 (2004). 
247 POWE, supra note 200, at 342 (testifying before Congress at the hearing on his nomina-
tion to the Court, now Chief Justice John Roberts “absurdly analogized a justice to an um-
pire.”). 
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